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Abstract—Security aspects of the Index Coding with Side
Information (ICSI) problem are investigated. Building on the
results of Bar-Yossef et al. (2006), the properties of linear
index codes are further explored. The notion of weak security,
considered by Bhattad and Narayanan (2005) in the context
of network coding, is generalized to block security. It is shown
that the linear index code based on a matrix L, whose column
space code C(L) has length n, minimum distance d and dual
distance d⊥, is (d− 1− t)-block secure (and hence also weakly
secure) if the adversary knows in advance t ≤ d− 2 messages,
and is completely insecure if the adversary knows in advance
more than n− d⊥ messages. Strong security is examined under
the conditions that the adversary: (i) possesses t messages in
advance; (ii) eavesdrops at most µ transmissions; (iii) corrupts
at most δ transmissions. We prove that for sufficiently large q, an
optimal linear index code which is strongly secure against such
an adversary has length κq+µ+2δ. Here κq is a generalization
of the min-rank over Fq of the side information graph for the
ICSI problem in its original formulation in the work of Bar-
Yossef et al.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of Index Coding with Side Information (ICSI)
was introduced by Birk and Kol [1], [2]. It was motivated by
applications such as audio and video-on-demand, and daily
newspaper delivery. In these applications a server (sender)
has to deliver some sets of data, audio or video files to
a set of clients (receivers), different sets are requested by
different receivers. Assume that before the transmission starts,
the receivers have already (from previous transmissions) some
files or movies in their possession. Via a slow backward
channel, the receivers can let the sender know which messages
they already have in their possession, and which messages
they request. By exploiting this information, the amount of
the overall transmissions can be reduced. As it was observed
in [1], this can be achieved by coding the messages at the
server before broadcasting them out.
Another possible application of the ICSI problem is in
opportunistic wireless networks. These are networks in which
a wireless node can opportunistically listen to the wireless
channel. As a result, the node may obtain packets that were
1The work of this author was done while he was with the Division
of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences,
Nanyang Technological University, 21 Nanyang Link, Singapore 637371.
not designated to it (see [3]–[5]). This way, a node obtains
some side information about the transmitted data. Exploiting
this additional knowledge may help to increase the throughput
of the system.
Consider the toy example in Figure 1. It presents a scenario
with one sender and four receivers. Each receiver requires a
different information packet (or message). The naı¨ve approach
requires four separate transmissions, one transmission per an
information packet. However, by exploiting the knowledge of
the subsets of messages that clients already have, and by using
coding of the transmitted data, the server can satisfy all the
demands by broadcasting just one coded packet.
The ICSI problem has been a subject of several recent
studies [3], [6]–[12]. This problem can be regarded as a special
case of the well-known network coding (NC) problem [13],
[14]. In particular, it was shown that every instance of the NC
problem can be reduced to an instance of the ICSI problem [3],
[10].
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Fig. 1: An example of the ICSI problem
Several previous works focused on the design of an efficient
index code for the ICSI problem. Given an instance of the
ICSI problem, Bar-Yossef et al. [6] proved that finding the
2best scalar linear binary index code is equivalent to finding
the so-called min-rank of a graph, which is known to be
an NP-hard problem (see [6], [15]). Here scalar linear index
codes refer to linear index codes in which each message is
a symbol in the field Fq. By contrast, in vector linear index
codes each message is a vector over Fq. Lubetzky and Stav
[7] showed that there exist instances in which scalar linear
index codes over nonbinary fields and linear index codes over
mixed fields outperform the scalar linear binary index codes.
El Rouayheb et al. [3], [10] showed that for certain instances
of the ICSI problem, vector linear index codes achieve strictly
higher transmission rate than scalar linear index codes do.
They also pointed out that there exist instances in which vector
nonlinear index codes outperform vector linear index codes.
Vector nonlinear index codes were also shown to outperform
scalar nonlinear index codes for certain instances by Alon et
al. [12]. Several heuristic solutions for the ICSI problem were
proposed in [9], [11].
In this paper, we study the security aspects of linear index
codes. We restrict ourselves to scalar linear index codes. It
is known that vector linear index codes can achieve better
transmission rate than their scalar counterparts, for certain
instances of the ICSI problem [3], [10]. However, if the block
length is fixed, one can model a vector index code as a scalar
index code applied to another instance of the ICSI problem.
If the block length is ℓ, the number of messages is n, and
the number of receivers is m in the original (vector) instance,
then the equivalent (scalar) instance can be viewed as having
ℓn messages and ℓm receivers.
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements. In its most general
formulation, a linear index code maps x ∈ Fnq onto (x|g)L,
where g ∈ Fηq is a random vector, L is an (n+ η)×N matrix
over Fq, and n, η,N ∈ N. In this work, we show that each
deterministic linear index code (i.e. η = 0) provides a certain
level of information security. More specifically, let the code
C(L) be spanned by the columns of L, and let d and d⊥ be
its minimum distance and dual distance, respectively. We say
that a particular adversary is of strength t if it has t messages
in its possession. Then, we show that the index code based on
L is (d−1−t)-block secure against all adversaries of strength
t ≤ d− 2 and is completely insecure against any adversary of
strength at least n − d⊥ + 1. If C(L) is an MDS code, then
the two bounds coincide. The technique used in the proof for
this result is reminiscent of that used in the constructions of
(multiple) secret sharing schemes from linear error-correcting
codes [16], [17]. The results on the security of linear index
codes can be further employed to analyze the existence of
solutions for a natural generalization of the ICSI problem, so-
called the Index Coding with Side and Restricted Information
(ICSRI) problem. In that problem, it is required that some
receivers have no information about some messages.
In the sequel, we also consider a non-deterministic linear
index code, based on the use of random symbols (i.e. η ≥ 1).
We show that the coset coding technique (which has been
successfully employed in Secure Network Coding literature,
see, for instance [18]–[22]) gives an optimal strongly secure
linear index code of length κq + µ + 2δ. This index code is
strongly secure against an adversary which:
(i) has t arbitrary messages in advance;
(ii) eavesdrops at most µ transmissions;
(iii) corrupts at most δ transmissions.
Previous works on the security aspects (and on the error-
correction aspect, as a special case) of network coding dealt
with the multicast scenario. One of the main reasons for this
limitation is that the optimal simultaneous transmission rates
for non-multicast networks have not been fully characterized
yet. The ICSI problem can be modeled as a special case
of the non-multicast Network Coding problem ( [3], [12]).
Moreover, being modeled in that way, it requires that there
are directed edges from particular sources to each sink, which
provide the side information. The symbols transmitted on these
special edges are not allowed to be corrupted, where usually
for network coding any edge can be corrupted. These two
differences restrict the ability to derive the results on the
security of the index coding schemes from the existing results
on security of network coding schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations and definitions,
which are used in the rest of the paper, are introduced in
Section II. The model and some basic results for the ICSI
problem are presented in Section III. The block security of
linear index codes is analyzed in Section IV. In particular, the
Index Coding with Side and Restricted Information problem is
presented and analyzed in Section IV-E. Section V is devoted
to the analysis of strong security for index coding. The paper
is concluded in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Recall that we use the notation Fq for the finite field with
q elements, where q is a power of prime. We also use F∗q for
the set of all nonzero elements of Fq . Let [n] denote the set of
integers {1, 2, . . . , n}. For the vectors u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈
Fnq and v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Fnq , the (Hamming) distance
between u and v is defined to be the number of coordinates
where u and v differ, namely,
d(u,v) = |{i ∈ [n] : ui 6= vi}|.
The support of a vector u ∈ Fnq is defined to be the set
supp(u) = {i ∈ [n] : ui 6= 0}. The (Hamming) weight of
a vector u, denoted wt(u), is defined to be |supp(u)|, the
number of nonzero coordinates of u.
A k-dimensional subspace C of Fnq is called a linear
[n, k, d]q (q-ary) code if the minimum distance of C,
d(C)
△
= min
u∈C, v∈C, u6=v
d(u,v) ,
is equal to d. Sometimes we may use the notation [n, k]q for
the sake of simplicity. The vectors in C are called codewords. It
is easy to see that the minimum weight of a nonzero codeword
in a linear code C is equal to its minimum distance d(C). A
generator matrix G of an [n, k]q-code C is a k × n matrix
whose rows are linearly independent codewords of C. Then
C = {yG : y ∈ Fkq}.
3The dual code or dual space of C is defined as C⊥ = {u ∈
Fnq : uc
T = 0 for all c ∈ C}. The minimum distance of C⊥,
d(C⊥), is called the dual distance of C.
The following upper bound on the minimum distance of a
q-ary linear code is well-known (see [23] Chapter 1).
Theorem 2.1 (Singleton bound): For an [n, k, d]q-code, we
have d ≤ n− k + 1.
Codes attaining this bound are called maximum distance
separable (MDS) codes. For a subset of vectors
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)} ⊆ Fnq ,
define its linear span over Fq:
spanq
(
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)}
)
△
={
k∑
i=1
αic
(i) : αi ∈ Fq, i ∈ [k]
}
.
We use ei = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
) ∈ Fnq to denote the
unit vector, which has a one at the ith position, and zeros
elsewhere. We also use In, n ∈ N, to denote the n×n identity
matrix.
We recall the following well-known result in coding theory.
Theorem 2.2 ( [24], p. 66): Let C be an [n, k, d]q-code
with dual distance d⊥ and M denote the qk×n matrix whose
qk rows are codewords of C. If r ≤ d⊥ − 1 then each r-tuple
from Fq appears in an arbitrary set of r columns of M exactly
qk−r times.
For a random vector Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) and a subset
B = {i1, i2, . . . , ib} of [n], where i1 < i2 < · · · < ib, let Y B
denote the vector (Yi1 , Yi2 , . . . , Yib). For an n× k matrix M ,
let M i denote the ith row of M , and M [j] its jth column.
For a set E ⊆ [n], let ME denote the |E|×k submatrix of M
formed by rows of M which are indexed by the elements of
E. For a set F ⊆ [k], let M [F ] denote the n× |F | submatrix
of M formed by columns of M which are indexed by the
elements of F .
Let X and Y be discrete random variables taking values
in the sets ΣX and ΣY , respectively. Let Pr(X = x) denote
the probability that X takes a particular value x ∈ ΣX . Let
H(X), H(X |Y ), I(X ;Y ), and I(X ;Y |Z) denote the (binary)
entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information, and condi-
tional mutual information (see [25] for the background).
III. INDEX CODING AND SOME BASIC RESULTS
The Index Coding with Side Information (ICSI) problem
considers the following communications scenario. There is a
unique sender (or source) S, who has a vector of messages
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ F
n
q in his possession, which is a
realized value of a random vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn).
X1, X2, . . . , Xn hereafter are assumed to be independent
uniformly distributed random variables over Fq . There are
also m receivers R1, R2, . . . , Rm. For each i ∈ [m], Ri has
some side information, i.e. Ri owns a subset of messages
{xj}j∈Xi , Xi ⊆ [n]. In addition, each Ri, i ∈ [m], is
interested in receiving the message xf(i), for some demand
function f : [m] → [n]. Here we assume that f(i) /∈ Xi
for all i ∈ [m]. Let X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xm). An instance of
the ICSI problem is given by a quadruple (m,n,X , f). Here
we assume that every receiver requests exactly one message.
This assumption is not a limitation of the model, as we can
consider an equivalent problem by splitting each receiver who
requests multiple messages into multiple receivers, each of
whom requests exactly one message and have the same set of
side information (see [1], [6]).
Definition 3.1: An index code over Fq for an instance
(m,n,X , f) of the ICSI problem, referred to as an
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq, is an encoding function
E : Fnq → F
N
q ,
such that for each receiver Ri, i ∈ [m], there exists a decoding
function
Di : F
N
q × F
|Xi|
q → Fq ,
satisfying
∀x ∈ Fnq : Di(E(x),xXi) = xf(i) .
The parameter N is called the length of the index code. In
the scheme corresponding to this code, S broadcasts a vector
E(x) of length N over Fq.
Definition 3.2: An index code of the shortest possible
length is called optimal.
Definition 3.3: A linear index code is an index code, for
which the encoding function E is a linear transformation over
Fq. Such a code can be described as
∀x ∈ Fnq : E(x) = xL ,
where L is an n×N matrix over Fq. The matrix L is called
the matrix corresponding to the index code E. We also refer
to E as the index code based on L. Notice that the length of
E is the number of columns of L.
Let E ⊆ [n] and u ∈ Fnq . In the sequel, we write u ⊳ E
if supp(u) ⊆ E. Intuitively, this means that if some receiver
knows xj for all j ∈ E (and also knows u), then this receiver
is also able to compute the value of xuT .
Hereafter, we assume that the sets Xi, for all i ∈ [m], are
known to S. Moreover, we also assume that the index code E
is known to each receiver Ri, i ∈ [m]. In practice this can be
achieved by a preliminary communication session, when the
knowledge of the sets Xi, for all i ∈ [m], and of the code E
are disseminated between the participants of the scheme.
Let C(L) = spanq({L[j]T }j∈[N ]), the subspace spanned
by the (transposed) columns of L. The following lemma was
implicitly formulated in [6] for the case where m = n,
f(i) = i for all i ∈ [m], and q = 2. This lemma specifies a
sufficient condition on C(L) so that a receiver can reconstruct
4a particular message. We reproduce this lemma with its proof
in its general form for the sake of completeness of the
presentation.
Lemma 3.1: Let L be an n × N matrix over Fq. Assume
that S broadcasts xL. Then, for each i ∈ [m], the receiver
Ri can reconstruct xf(i) if there exists a vector u(i) ∈ Fnq
satisfying
1) u(i) ⊳ Xi;
2) u(i) + ef(i) ∈ C(L).
Proof: Assume that u(i) ⊳ Xi and u(i) + ef(i) ∈ C(L).
Since u(i) + ef(i) ∈ C(L), there exists β ∈ FNq such that
u(i) + ef(i) = βL
T .
By taking the transpose and pre-multiplying by x, we obtain
x(u(i) + ef(i))
T = (xL)βT .
Therefore,
xf(i) = xe
T
f(i) = (xL)β
T − xu(i)
T
.
Observe that Ri is able to find u(i) and β from the knowledge
of L. Moreover, Ri is also able to compute xu(i)
T
since
u(i) ⊳ Xi. Additionally, Ri knows xL, which is transmitted
by S. Therefore, Ri is able to compute xf(i).
Remark 3.2: It follows from Lemma 3.1 that L corresponds
to a linear (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if C(L) ⊇ spanq({u(i) +
ef(i)}i∈[m]), for some u(i) ⊳ Xi, i ∈ [m]. We show later in
Corollary 4.5 that this condition is also necessary. Finding such
an L with minimal number of columns by careful selection of
u(i)’s is a difficult task (in fact it is NP-hard to do so, see [6],
[15]), which, however, yields a linear coding scheme with the
minimal number of transmissions.
IV. BLOCK SECURE LINEAR INDEX CODES
A. Block Security and Weak Security
In this section, we assume the presence of an adversary A
who can listen to all transmissions. Assume that S employs
a linear index code based on L. The adversary is assumed
to possess side information {xj}j∈XA , where XA ( [n]. For
short, we say that A knows (or possesses, owns) xXA . The
strength of A is defined to be |XA|. Denote X̂A
△
= ([n]\XA).
Note that by listening to S, the adversary also knows s △=
E(x) = xL. We define below several levels of security for
linear index codes.
Definition 4.1: Suppose that the sender S possesses a vector
of messages x ∈ Fnq , which is a realized value of a random
vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), whose coordinates Xi, i ∈
[n], are all independent and uniformly distributed over Fq. An
adversary A possesses xXA . Consider a linear (m,n,X , f)-IC
over Fq based on L.
1) For B ⊆ X̂A, the adversary is said to have no information
about xB if
H(XB|XL,XXA) = H(XB). (1)
In other words, despite the partial knowledge on x
that the adversary has (his side information and the
transmissions he eavesdrops), the symbols xB still looks
completely random to him.
2) The index code is said to be b-block secure against XA
if for every b-subset B ⊆ X̂A, the adversary has no
information about xB .
3) The index code is said to be b-block secure against all
adversaries of strength t (0 ≤ t ≤ n− 1) if it is b-block
secure against XA for every XA ⊂ [n], |XA| = t.
4) The index code is said to be weakly secure against
XA if it is 1-block secure against XA. In other words,
after listening to all transmissions, the adversary has no
information about each particular message that he does
not possess in the first place.
5) The index code is said to be weakly secure against all
adversaries of strength t (0 ≤ t ≤ n− 1) if it is weakly
secure against XA for every t-subset XA of [n].
6) The index code is said to be completely insecure against
XA if an adversary, who possesses {xi}i∈XA , by listening
to all transmissions, is able to determine xi for all i ∈ X̂A.
7) The index code is said to be completely insecure against
any adversary of strength t (0 ≤ t ≤ n − 1) if an
adversary, who possesses an arbitrary set of t messages, is
always able to reconstruct all of the other n− t messages
after listening to all transmissions.
Remark 4.1: Even when the index code is b-block secure
(b ≥ 1) as defined above, the adversary is still able to
obtain information about dependencies between various xi’s
in X̂A (but he gains no information about any group of b
particular messages). This definition of b-block security is
a generalization of that of weak security (see [26], [27]).
Obviously, if an index code is b-block secure against XA
(b ≥ 1) then it is also weakly secure against XA, but the
converse is not always true.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Block Security
In the sequel, we consider the sets B ⊆ [n], B 6= ∅, and
E ⊆ [n], E 6= ∅. Moreover, we assume that the sets XA,
B, and E are disjoint, and that they form a partition of [n],
namely XA ∪B ∪ E = [n]. In particular, X̂A = B ∪ E.
Lemma 4.2: Assume that for all u⊳XA and for all αi ∈ Fq,
i ∈ B (not all αi’s are zeros),
u+
∑
i∈B
αiei /∈ C(L). (2)
Then,
1) for all i ∈ B:
Li ∈ spanq({Lj}j∈E); (3)
2) the system
yLE = wLB (4)
has at least one solution y ∈ F|E|q for every choice of
w ∈ F
|B|
q .
5Proof:
1) If rankq(LE) = N then the first claim follows immedi-
ately. Otherwise, assume that rankq(LE) < N . As the
N columns of LE are linearly dependent, there exists
y ∈ FNq \{0} such that yL
T
E = 0.
• If for all such y and for all i ∈ B we have
yLTi = 0, then Li ∈ ((spanq({Lj}j∈E))⊥)⊥ =
spanq({Lj}j∈E) for all i ∈ B.
• Otherwise, there exist y ∈ FNq and i ∈ B such that
yLTE = 0 and yLTi 6= 0. Without loss of generality,
assume that
L =
 LXALB
LE
 .
Let c = yLT ∈ C(L). Then
c = (cXA |cB|cE) =
(
yLTXA
∣∣yLTB∣∣yLTE).
Hence cB = yLTB 6= 0 and cE = yLTE = 0. Let
u = (cXA |0|0)⊳XA and αi = ci for all i ∈ B. Then
αi’s are not all zero and u+
∑
i∈B αiei = c ∈ C(L),
which contradicts (2).
2) By (3), each row of LB is a linear combination of rows
of LE . Hence wLB is also a linear combination of rows
of LE . Therefore, (4) has at least one solution.
While Lemma 3.1 does not discuss security, it provides
sufficient conditions for successful reconstruction of the infor-
mation by a legitimate receiver Ri. Obviously, the legitimate
receiver Ri can be replaced by an adversary A in the formula-
tion of that lemma. Thus, the conditions in Lemma 3.1 can be
viewed as sufficient conditions for absence of weak security
with respect to this A.
In Lemma 4.3, which appears below, we show that the same
conditions are also necessary (for the absence of information
security with respect to the adversary A). However, similarly,
A can be replaced by a legitimate receiver Ri in the formu-
lation of Lemma 4.3. Thus, this lemma also provides both
necessary and sufficient conditions for successful reconstruc-
tion of the information by the legitimate receiver Ri.
Additionally, in Lemma 4.3, the weak security is further
generalized to block security.
Lemma 4.3: Let L be an n × N matrix over Fq. Assume
that S broadcasts xL. For a subset B ⊆ X̂A, an adversary
A who owns xXA , after listening to all transmissions, has no
information about xB if and only if
∀u⊳ XA, ∀αi ∈ Fq with αi, i ∈ B, not all zero:
u+
∑
i∈B
αiei /∈ C(L). (5)
In particular, for each i ∈ X̂A, A has no information about xi
if and only if
∀u⊳ XA : u+ ei /∈ C(L).
Proof: Assume that (5) holds. We need to show that
H(XB|XL,XXA) = H(XB). It suffices to show that for
all g ∈ F|B|q :
Pr(XB = g|XL = s, XXA = xXA) =
1
q|B|
, (6)
where s = xL for some x ∈ Fnq .
Consider the following linear system with the unknown z ∈
Fnq 
zB = g
zXA = xXA
zL = s
,
which is equivalent to
zB = g
zXA = xXA
zELE = s−gLB−xXALXA
. (7)
In order to prove that (6) holds, it suffices to show that for
all choices of g ∈ F|B|q , (7) always has the same number of
solutions z. Notice that the number of solutions z of (7) is
equal to the number of solutions zE of
zELE = s− gLB − xXALXA , (8)
where s, g, and xXA are known. For any g ∈ F
|B|
q , if (8) has a
solution, then it has exactly q|E|−rankq(LE) different solutions.
Therefore, it suffices to prove that (8) has at least one solution
for every g ∈ F|B|q .
Since x is an obvious solution of (7), we have
xELE = s− xBLB − xXALXA . (9)
Subtract (9) from (8) we obtain
(zE − xE)LE = (xB − g)LB,
which can be rewritten as
yLE = wLB, (10)
where y △= zE − xE , w
△
= xB − g. Due to Lemma 4.2, (10)
always has a solution y, for every choice of w. Therefore (8)
has at least one solution for every g ∈ F|B|q .
Now we prove the converse. Assume that (5) does not hold.
Then there exist u⊳XA and αi ∈ Fq, i ∈ B, where αi’s, i ∈ B
are not all zero, such that∑
i∈B
αiei = c− u ,
for some c ∈ C(L). Hence, similar to the proof of Lemma
3.1, the adversary obtains
∑
i∈B
αixi = x
(∑
i∈B
αiei
)T
= x(c− u)T
= xcT − xuT .
6Note that the adversary can calculate xcT from s, and can also
find xuT based on his own side information. Therefore, A is
able to compute a nontrivial linear combination of xi’s, i ∈ B.
Hence the entropy H(XB|XL,XXA) < H(XB). Thus, the
adversary gains some information about the xB .
Corollary 4.4 generalizes Lemma 3.1 by providing both
necessary and sufficient conditions for a receiver’s ability to
recover the desired message. (Note that this corollary can be
equally applied to the legitimate receiver Ri as well as to the
adversary A.)
Corollary 4.4: Let L be an n×N matrix over Fq and let
S broadcast xL. Then for each i ∈ [m], the receiver Ri can
reconstruct xf(i) if and only if there exists a vector u(i) ∈ Fnq
such that
1) u(i) ⊳ Xi;
2) u(i) + ef(i) ∈ C(L).
Corollary 4.5: The matrix L corresponds to a linear
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if and only if for all i ∈ [m], there
exists a vector u(i) ∈ Fnq satisfying
1) u(i) ⊳ Xi;
2) u(i) + ef(i) ∈ C(L).
Remark 4.6: It follows from Corollary 4.5 that L corre-
sponds to a linear (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if and only if
C(L) ⊇ spanq({u
(i) + ef(i)}i∈[m]), for some u(i) ⊳ Xi,
i ∈ [m]. If we define
κq = κq(m,n,X , f)
△
= min{rankq({u
(i) + ef(i)}i∈[m]) : u
(i) ∈ Fnq ,u
(i)
⊳ Xi},
(11)
then κq is the shortest possible length of a linear (m,n,X , f)-
IC over Fq .
Corollary 4.7: The length of an optimal linear
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq is κq = κq(m,n,X , f).
Remark 4.8: The quantity κq defined in (11) is precisely
the min-rank over Fq of the side information graph of an ICSI
instance in the case m = n and f(i) = i for all i ∈ [n].
Idea of the proof: Recall that in [6], the side information
graph G of an instance of the ICSI problem is defined by
G = (VG , EG), where VG = [n] and
EG = {e = (i, j) : i, j ∈ [n], j ∈ Xi}.
A matrix A over Fq is said to fit G ( [28]) if{
ai,j 6= 0, if i = j,
ai,j = 0, if i 6= j, (i, j) /∈ EG .
Then the min-rank of the side information graph G is defined
by
min{rankq(A) : A fits G}.
Suppose that u(i) ⊳ Xi for all i ∈ [n]. Let A = (ai,j) be
the n × n matrix whose ith row is precisely u(i) + ei, for
each i ∈ [n]. Then A fits G. Conversely, if A′ fits G then by
multiplying each row of A′ with a suitable nonzero constant
(which does not change the rank of A′), one obtains a matrix
A which is of the aforementioned form. In other words, for
each i ∈ [n], the ith row of the resulting matrix A equals
u(i) + ei for some u(i) ⊳ Xi. Therefore, κq defined above is
indeed the minimum rank over Fq of a matrix which fits the
side information graph G. Thus, κq is precisely the min-rank
over Fq of G.
Theorem 4.9: Consider a linear (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq
based on L. Let d be the minimum distance of C(L).
1) This index code is (d − 1 − t)-block secure against all
adversaries of strength t ≤ d−2. In particular, it is weakly
secure against all adversaries of strength t = d− 2.
2) This index code is not weakly secure against at least one
adversary of strength t = d− 1. Generally, if there exists
a codeword of C(L) of weight w, then this index code
is not weakly secure against at least one adversary of
strength t = w − 1.
3) Every adversary of strength t ≤ d−1 is able to determine
a list of qn−t−N vectors in Fnq which includes the vector
of messages x.
Proof:
1) Assume that t ≤ d−2. By Lemma 4.3, it suffices to show
that for every t-subset XA of [n] and for every (d−1−t)-
subset B of X̂A,
∀u⊳ XA, ∀αi ∈ Fq with αi, i ∈ B, not all zero :
u+
∑
i∈B
αiei /∈ C(L).
For such u and αi’s, we have wt(u +
∑
i∈B αiei) =
wt(u) + wt(
∑
i∈B αiei) ≤ t+ (d− 1− t) = d− 1 < d.
Moreover, as supp(u) ∩ B = ∅ and αi’s, i ∈ B, are
not all zero, we deduce that u +
∑
i∈B αiei 6= 0. We
conclude that u+
∑
i∈B αiei /∈ C(L).
2) We now show that the index code is not weakly secure
against at least one adversary of strength t = d− 1. The
more general statement can be proved in an analogous
way.
Pick a codeword c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C(L) such that
wt(c) = d and let supp(c) = {i1, i2, . . . , id}. Take XA =
{i1, i2, . . . , id−1}, |XA| = d− 1. Let
u = (c/cid − eid) .
Then, u⊳XA and u+ eid = c/cid ∈ C(L). By Lemma
3.1, A is able to determine xid . Hence the index code is
not weakly secure against the adversary A, who knows
d− 1 messages xi’s in advance.
3) Let s = xL. Consider the following linear system of
equations with unknown z ∈ Fnq{
zXA = xXA
zL = s
,
7which is equivalent to{
zXA = xXA
zX̂ALX̂A = s− xXALXA
. (12)
The adversary A attempts to solve this system. Given
that s and xXA are known, the system (12) has n − t
unknowns and N equations. Note that t ≤ d − 1, and
thus by applying Theorem 2.1 to C(L) we have n− t ≥
n−d+1 ≥ N . If rankq(LX̂A) = N then (12) has exactly
qn−t−N solutions, as required.
Next, we show that rankq(LX̂A) = N . Assume, by
contrary, that the N columns of LX̂A , denoted by
c(1), c(2), . . . , c(N), are linearly dependent. Then there
exist βi ∈ Fq, i ∈ [N ], not all zero, such that∑N
i=1 βic
(i) = 0. Let
c =
N∑
i=1
βiL[i] ∈ C(L)\{0} .
(Recall that L[i] denotes the ith column of L). Then
cX̂A =
∑N
i=1 βic
(i) = 0 and hence wt(c) = wt(cXA) ≤
t ≤ d − 1. This is a contradiction, which follows from
the assumption that the N rows of LX̂A are linearly
dependent.
Example 4.1: Let q = 2. Assume that XA = ∅ and that
Xi 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [m]. For each i ∈ [m] choose some
ji ∈ Xi. Let L be the binary matrix whose columns form a
basis of the space C(L) = spanq({eji + ef(i)}i∈[m]). Then
d(C(L)) = 2. Since t = |XA| = 0, we have d − 1 − t =
1. Therefore by Theorem 4.9 the index code based on L is
weakly secure against A. Moreover, if C(L) is nontrivial then
L has N ≤ n − d = n − 2 columns. In other words, in
that case, the index code based on L requires at most n − 2
transmissions.
C. Block Security and Complete Insecurity
Theorem 4.9 provides a threshold for the security level of a
linear index code based on L. If A has a prior knowledge of
any t ≤ d−2 messages, where d = d(C(L)), then the scheme
is still secure, i.e. the adversary has no information about any
group of d − 1 − t particular messages from {xj}j∈X̂A . On
the other hand, the scheme may no longer be secure against
an adversary of strength t = d − 1. The last assertion of
Theorem 4.9 shows us the difference between being block
secure and being strongly secure. More specifically, if the
scheme is strongly secure, the messages xX̂A , which are not
leaked to the adversary in advance, look completely random
to the adversary, i.e. the probability to guess them correctly is
1/qn−t. However, if the scheme is (d−1−t)-block secure (for
t ≤ d− 2), then the adversary is able to guess these messages
correctly with probability 1/qn−t−N .
For an adversary of strength t ≥ d, the security of the
scheme depends on the properties of the code employed, in
particular, it depends on the weight distribution of C(L). From
Theorem 4.9, if there exists c ∈ C(L) with wt(c) = w, then
the scheme is not weakly secure against some adversary of
strength t = w−1. In general, the index code might still be (b-
block or weakly) secure against some adversaries of strength
t for t ≥ d. While we cannot make a general conclusion on
the security of the scheme when the adversary’s strength is
larger than d− 1, Lemma 4.3 is still a useful tool to evaluate
the security in that situation. However, as the next theorem
shows, if the size of XA is sufficiently large, then A is able
to determine all the messages in {xj}j∈X̂A .
Theorem 4.10: The linear index code based on L is com-
pletely insecure against any adversary of strength t ≥ n −
d⊥ + 1, where d⊥ denotes the dual distance of C(L).
Proof: Suppose the adversary knows a subset {xj}j∈XA ,
XA ( [n] and |XA| = t ≥ n − d⊥ + 1. By Corollary 4.4,
it suffices to show that for all j ∈ XˆA, there exists u ∈ Fnq
satisfying simultaneously u⊳ XA and u+ ej ∈ C(L).
Indeed, take any j ∈ X̂A, and let ρ = n − t ≤ d⊥ − 1.
Consider the ρ indices which are not in XA. By Theorem 2.2,
there exists a codeword c ∈ C(L) with
cℓ =
{
1 if ℓ = j,
0 if ℓ /∈ XA ∪ {j}
.
Then supp(c) ⊆ XA ∪ {j}. We define u ∈ Fnq such that
u ⊳ XA, as follows. For ℓ ∈ XA, we set uℓ = cℓ, and for
ℓ /∈ XA, we set uℓ = 0. It is immediately clear that c = u+ej .
Therefore, by Corollary 4.4, the adversary can reconstruct xj .
We have shown that the index code is completely insecure
against an arbitrary set XA satisfying |XA| ≥ n − d⊥ + 1,
hence completing the proof.
When C(L) is an MDS code, we have n−d⊥+1 = d−1, and
hence the two bounds established in Theorems 4.9 and 4.10
are actually tight. The following example further illustrates the
results stated in these theorems.
Example 4.2: Let n = 7, m = 7, q = 2, and f(i) = i for all
i ∈ [m]. Suppose that the receivers have in their possession
sets of messages as appear in the third column of the table
below. Suppose also, that the demands of all receivers are as
in the second column of the table.
Receiver Demand {xj}i∈Xi
R1 x1 {x6, x7}
R2 x2 {x5, x7}
R3 x3 {x5, x6}
R4 x4 {x5, x6, x7}
R5 x5 {x1, x2, x6}
R6 x6 {x1, x3, x4}
R7 x7 {x2, x3, x6}
For i ∈ [7], let u(i) ∈ F72 such that supp(u(i)) = Xi.
Assume that an index code based on L with C(L) =
spanq({u
(i)+ei}i∈[7]) is used. For instance, we can take L to
be the matrix whose set of columns is {L[i] △= u(i)+ei}i∈[4].
8It is easy to see that C(L) is a [7, 4, 3]2 Hamming code with
d = 3 and d⊥ = 4.
Following the coding scheme, S broadcasts the following
four bits:
s1 = x(u
(1) + e1)
T
,
s2 = x(u
(2) + e2)
T
,
s3 = x(u
(3) + e3)
T
,
s4 = x(u
(4) + e4)
T
.
Each Ri, i ∈ [7], can compute x(u(i) + ei)T by using a
linear combination of s1, s2, s3, s4. Then, each Ri can subtract
xu(i)
T (his side information) from x(u(i) + ei)T to retrieve
xi = xe
T
i .
For example, consider R5. Since
x
(
u(5) + e5
)T
= x
(
(u(1) + e1) + (u
(2) + e2)
)T
= s1+s2,
R5 subtracts x1 + x2 + x6 from s1 + s2 to obtain
(s1 + s2)− (x1 + x2 + x6)
= (x1 + x2 + x5 + x6)− (x1 + x2 + x6)
= x5.
If an adversary A has a knowledge of a single message xi,
then by Theorem 4.9, A is not able to determine any other
message xℓ, for ℓ 6= i. Indeed, d(C(L)) = 3, while t = 1, the
code is weakly secure against all adversaries of strength t = 1.
If none of the messages are leaked, then the adversary has
no information about any group of 2 messages. On the other
hand, the code is completely insecure against any adversary
of strength t ≥ 4; in that case A is able to determine the
remaining 7− t messages.
Remark 4.11: So far we only discuss the case when the
adversary can listen to all N transmissions. If we consider an
adversary, which can eavesdrop at most µ (µ ≤ N ) messages,
then analogous results can also be obtained. Consider a linear
index code based on L. Let
dµ
△
= min
{
d(C(L[W ])) : W ⊆ [N ], |W | = µ
}
,
and
d⊥µ
△
= min
{
d((C(L[W ]))⊥) : W ⊆ [N ], |W | = µ
}
.
Then it is straightforward to see that the results in Theo-
rems 4.9 and 4.10 still hold, with d and d⊥ being replaced
by dµ and d⊥µ , respectively.
D. Role of the Field Size
The following example demonstrates that the use of index
codes over larger fields might have a positive impact on the
security level. More specifically, in that example, index codes
over large fields significantly enhance the security, compared
with index codes over small fields.
Example 4.3: Suppose that the source S has n messages
x1, x2, . . . , xn. Assume that there are m < n receivers
R1, R2, . . . , Rm, and each receiver Ri has the same set of
side information, Xi = {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n}. Assume also
that each Ri requires xi, for i ∈ [m].
Any index code for this instance must have length at least
m, since all the vectors u(i)+ei, for some u(i)⊳Xi, i ∈ [m],
are linearly independent over any field.
If we employ an index code over F2, by the fact that
there are no nontrivial binary MDS codes, we deduce that
the minimum distance d of C(L) is at most n − m. Hence
index codes over F2 is not secure against some adversaries of
strength t = n−m− 1. However, if we consider index codes
over Fq for sufficiently large q (q ≥ n−1), there exists a q-ary
MDS code C with minimum distance exactly n−m+ 1. By
choosing L so that C(L) = C, the index code based on L is
secure against all adversaries of strength at most t = n−m−1,
which is strictly more secure than the those over F2. To find
such an L, let M = (Im|P ) be a generator matrix in standard
form of an [n,m]q-MDS code, and then take L =MT . Then
L[i] = u(i)+e(i), for some u(i)⊳Xi = {m+1,m+2, . . . , n},
i ∈ [m]. Therefore, by Corollary 4.5, L corresponds to a linear
index code for this instance.
Note that if we employ an index code over F2, then for
large values of n the minimum distance d of C(L) is bounded
from above by the sphere-packing bound
d ≤ 2n · (H−1(1−m/n)− ε),
where ε→ 0 as n→∞. There is a variety of stronger upper
bounds on the minimum distance of binary codes, such as the
Johnson bound, the Elias bound, and the McEliece-Rodemich-
Rumsey-Welch bound (see [29, Chapter 4.5] for more details).
These bounds provide even stronger bounds on the security of
the binary scheme for this instance of the ICSI problem. By
contrast, as shown above, by using a q-ary MDS code, the
distance d of C(L) can achieve the Singleton bound. It is well
known that there is a significant gap between the Singleton
bound and the sphere-packing bound (see [29, p. 111] for
details). Therefore, for this instance of the ICSI problem, index
codes over large fields provide significantly higher levels of
security than those over binary field.
E. Application: Index Coding with Side and Restricted Infor-
mation
In this section, we consider an extension of the ICSI
problem, which we call the Index Coding with Side and
Restricted Information (ICSRI) problem. This problem arises
in applications such as audio and video-on-demand. Consider
a client who has subscribed for certain media content (audio
or video programs, movies, newspapers, etc.) At the same
time, this client has not subscribed to some other content. The
content provider wants to restrict this client from obtaining a
content which he is not eligible for, even though he might be
able to obtain it “for free” from the transmissions provided
by the server. As we show in sequel, the solution for the
ICSRI problem is a straight-forward application of the results
in Corollary 4.4.
More formally, the arguments of an instance (m,n,X ,Z, f)
of the ICSRI problem are similar to their counterparts for
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(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zm), represents the sets Zi ⊆ [n] of message in-
dices that the respective receivers Ri, i ∈ [m], are not allowed
to obtain. The goal is that at the end of the communication
round, the receiver Ri has the message xf(i) in its possession,
for all i ∈ [m], and it has no information about xj for all
j ∈ Zi. The notion of a linear (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq is
naturally extended to that of a linear (m,n,X ,Z, f)-IC over
Fq.
Let
F(m,n,X ,Z, f)
△
=
m⋃
i=1
{u+ ej : u⊳ Xi, j ∈ Zi} .
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for a linear index code to be also a solution to an
instance of the ICSRI problem.
Proposition 4.12: The linear (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq based
on L is also a linear (m,n,X ,Z, f)-IC if and only if C(L)∩
F(m,n,X ,Z, f) = ∅.
Proof: Let S employ the (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq based
on L. Then clearly Ri can recover xf(i) for all i ∈ [m]. Due
to Lemma 4.3, for each i ∈ [m] and j ∈ Zi, Ri has no
information about xj if and only if
∀u⊳ Xi : u+ ej /∈ C(L).
Hence we complete the proof.
Example 4.4: Consider an instance (m,n,X ,Z, f) of the
ICSRI problem where m, n, X , and f are defined as in
Example 4.2. Moreover, let Z = (Z1,Z2, . . . ,Z7), where
Z1 = {2, 3, 4, 5}, Z2 = {1, 3, 4, 6}, Z3 = {1, 2, 4, 7}, and
Z4 = Z5 = Z6 = Z7 = ∅. Consider the index code
based on L constructed in Example 4.2. It is straightforward
to verify that C(L) ∩ F(m,n,X ,Z, f) = ∅. Therefore, by
Proposition 4.12, this index code also provides a solution to
this instance of the ICSRI problem.
Let
κ∗q = κ
∗
q(m,n,X ,Z, f)
△
= min{rankq({u
(i) + ef(i)}i∈[m])},
where the minimum is taken over all choices of u(i) ⊳ Xi,
i ∈ [m], which satisfy
spanq
(
{u(i) + ef(i)}i∈[m]
)
∩ F(m,n,X ,Z, f) = ∅. (13)
Let κ∗q = +∞ if there are no choices of u(i)’s, i ∈ [m], which
satisfy (13). The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 4.13: The length of an optimal linear
(m,n,X ,Z, f)-IC over Fq is κ∗q . If κ∗q = +∞ then there
exist no linear (m,n,X ,Z, f)-ICs over Fq.
V. STRONGLY SECURE INDEX CODES WITH SIDE
INFORMATION
In this section, we consider a different model of adversary.
Similarly to its counterpart in Section IV, the adversary A in
this section owns some prior side information. Additionally,
A can listen to µ ≤ N transmissions of S. It can also corrupt
some transmissions of S, received by any of Ri, i ∈ [m].
We start the analysis with some basic definitions of error-
correcting index codes. This type of index codes was studied
very recently by the authors of this paper in [30]. We repeat
some basic results for the sake of completeness.
A. Error-Correcting Index Codes
Assume that some of the symbols received by Ri, i ∈ [m],
are in error. Consider an ICSI instance (m,n,X , f), and
assume that S broadcasts a vector E(x) ∈ FNq . Let ξ
(i) ∈ FNq
be the error affecting the information received by Ri, i ∈ [m].
Then Ri actually receives the vector
y(i) = E(x) + ξ(i) ∈ FNq ,
instead of E(x). The following definition is a generalization
of Definition 3.1.
Definition 5.1: A δ-error-correcting index code over Fq for
an instance (m,n,X , f) of the ICSI problem, referred to as
a δ-error-correcting (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq, is an encoding
function
E : Fnq → F
N
q ,
such that for each receiver Ri, i ∈ [m], there exists a decoding
function
Di : F
N
q × F
|Xi|
q → Fq ,
satisfying
∀x, ξ(i) ∈ Fnq , wt(ξ
(i)) ≤ δ : Di(E(x)+ξ
(i),xXi) = xf(i) .
The definitions of the length, of a linear index code, and of the
matrix corresponding to an index code are naturally extended
to δ-error-correcting index codes.
We define the following sets
I(q,m, n,X , f)
△
= {z ∈ Fnq : ∃i ∈ [m] such that zXi = 0 and zf(i) 6= 0}.
For each i ∈ [m] we also define
Yi
△
= [n]\
(
{f(i)} ∪ Xi
)
.
Then the collection of supports of all vectors in
I(q,m, n,X , f) is precisely
J (m,n,X , f)
△
=
⋃
i∈[m]
{
{f(i)} ∪ Yi : Yi ⊆ Yi
}
. (14)
The necessary and sufficient condition for a matrix L to
correspond to a linear δ-error-correcting index code is given
in the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.1: The matrix L corresponds to a linear δ-error-
correcting (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if and only if
wt(zL) ≥ 2δ + 1 for all z ∈ I(q,m, n,X , f). (15)
Equivalently, L corresponds to a linear δ-error-correcting
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if and only if
wt
(∑
i∈K
ziLi
)
≥ 2δ + 1,
for all K ∈ J (m,n,X , f) and for all choices of nonzero
zi ∈ Fq, i ∈ K .
Proof: For each x ∈ Fnq , we define
B(x, δ) = {cˆ ∈ Fnq : cˆ = xL+ ξ, wt(ξ) ≤ δ, ξ ∈ F
n
q },
the set of all vectors resulting from at most δ errors in the
transmitted vector associated with the information vector x.
Then the receiver Ri can recover xf(i) correctly if and only
if
B(x, δ) ∩B(x′, δ) = ∅,
for every pair x,x′ ∈ Fnq satisfying:
xXi = x
′
Xi and xf(i) 6= x
′
f(i).
Therefore, L correspond to a linear δ-error-correcting
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if and only if the following condition
is satisfied: for all i ∈ [m] and for all x,x′ ∈ Fnq such that
xXi = x
′
Xi
and xf(i) 6= x′f(i), it holds
∀ξ, ξ′ ∈ FNq , wt(ξ) ≤ δ, wt(ξ
′) ≤ δ :
xL+ ξ 6= x′L+ ξ′ . (16)
Denote z = x′ − x. Then, the condition in (16) can be
reformulated as follows: for all i ∈ [n] and for all z ∈ Fnq
such that zXi = 0 and zf(i) 6= 0, it holds
∀ξ, ξ′ ∈ FNq , wt(ξ) ≤ δ, wt(ξ
′) ≤ δ : zL 6= ξ−ξ′ . (17)
The equivalent condition is that for all z ∈ I(q,m, n,X , f),
wt(zL) ≥ 2δ + 1 .
Since for z ∈ I(q,m, n,X , f) we have
zL =
∑
i∈supp(z)
ziLi,
the condition (15) can be restated as
wt
(∑
i∈K
ziLi
)
≥ 2δ + 1,
for all K ∈ J (m,n,X , f) and for all choices of nonzero
zi ∈ Fq, i ∈ K .
The next corollary follows directly from Lemma 5.1 by
considering an error-free setup, i.e. δ = 0. It is easy to verify
that the conditions stated in this corollary and in Corollary 4.5
are equivalent, as expected.
Corollary 5.2: The matrix L corresponds to an
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq if and only if
wt
(∑
i∈K
ziLi
)
≥ 1,
for all K ∈ J (m,n,X , f) and for all choices of nonzero
zi ∈ Fq , i ∈ K .
B. A Lower Bound on the Length
We start this section with a generalization of the definition
of index codes to randomized index codes. Consider η ∈ N
random variables G1, G2, . . . , Gη, which are distributed inde-
pendently and uniformly over Fq . Let G = (G1, G2, . . . , Gη)
and let g = (g1, g2, . . . , gη) be a realization of G.
Definition 5.2: An η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq
for an instance (m,n,X , f) is an encoding function
E : Fnq × F
η
q → F
N
q ,
such that for each receiver Ri, i ∈ [m], there exists a decoding
function
Di : F
N
q × F
|Xi|
q → Fq ,
satisfying
∀x ∈ Fnq : Di(E(x, g),xXi) = xf(i) ,
for any g ∈ Fηq , which is a realization of the random vector
G.
The definition of a δ-error-correcting index code can be
naturally extended to that of a δ-error-correcting randomized
index code. We simply replace E : Fnq → FNq by E : Fnq ×
Fηq → F
N
q , and E(x) by E(x, g) in Definition 5.1.
An η-randomized index code is linear over Fq if it has a
linear encoding function E,
E(x, g) = (x | g)L ,
where L is an (n + η) × N matrix over Fq. In the se-
quel we assume that any message xi, i ∈ [n] is requested
by at least one receiver. Observe that by simply treating
x1, x2, . . . , xn, g1, g2, . . . , gη as messages, the results from
previous sections still apply to linear randomized index codes.
Definition 5.3: The linear η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC
over Fq based on L is said to be (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure if it
has the following two properties:
1) This code is δ-error-correcting. In other words, upon
receiving (x|g)L with at most δ coordinates in error, the
receiver Ri can still recover xf(i), for all i ∈ [m].
2) This code is (µ, t)-strongly secure. In other words, an
adversary A who possesses xXA , for XA ⊆ [n], |XA| = t,
and listens to at most µ transmissions, µ ≤ N , gains no
information about other messages. Equivalently,
H(XX̂A | (X |G)L[W ],XXA) = H(XX̂A),
for any W ⊆ [N ], |W | ≤ µ.
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Remark 5.3:
1) If µ = t = η = 0, then a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure η-
randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq is simply a δ-error-
correcting (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq .
2) If δ = 0, the index code is strongly secure, but has
no error-correcting capability. In that case, we simply
say that the code is “(µ, t)-strongly secure” instead of
“(µ, t, 0)-strongly secure”.
3) A simple concatenation of an error-correcting index cod-
ing scheme and a secure index coding scheme may not
necessarily yield a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure η-randomized
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq.
In the lemma below, we assume that each message is
requested by at least one receiver. Otherwise, that “useless”
message can be discarded without affecting the model.
Lemma 5.4: If L corresponds to a (µ, t)-strongly secure
linear η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq, then η ≥ µ.
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose
that L corresponds to a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure η-randomized
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq, and that η < µ. Let E = {n+1, n+
2, . . . , n+ η}.
For W ⊆ [N ] let C(L[W ]) be the space spanned by columns
of L indexed by elements of W . Then, for all W ⊆ [N ] with
|W | ≤ µ, it holds that
H(XX̂A |(X |G)L[W ],XXA) = H(X X̂A),
i.e. an adversary who owns xXA gains no information about
xX̂A after eavesdropping the transmissions corresponding to
the set of indices W . From Lemma 4.3 with C(L) being
replaced by C(L[W ]), we conclude that C(L[W ]) does not
contain a vector c which satisfies cX̂A 6= 0 and cE = 0. In
the sequel, we refer to this property of C(L[W ]) as Property A.
Let L′ = (LX̂A∪E)
T be the matrix obtained from L by
first deleting rows of L indexed by XA, and then taking its
transpose. We show that rankq(L′) ≤ µ − 1. Indeed, take
any µ rows of L′, denote them L′j1 , . . . ,L
′
jµ
. Let L′′ be the
submatrix of L′ formed by the last η columns. Since η < µ,
the µ rows L′′j1 , . . . ,L
′′
jµ
are linearly dependent. Hence, there
exist α1, α2, . . . , αµ, not all zeros, such that
µ∑
ℓ=1
αℓL
′′
jℓ
= 0 .
This implies
µ∑
ℓ=1
αℓL
′
jℓ
= 0 ,
due to Property A. Thus, rankq(L′) ≤ µ− 1.
Now let r △= rankq(L′) < µ, and let
{L′j1 ,L
′
j2
, . . . ,L′jr}
be a basis of the space spanned by the rows of L′. Suppose
that the receiver Ri requests xf(i) where f(i) ∈ X̂A.
• On the one hand, by Corollary 4.5, C(L) contains a vector
c = u(i)+ef(i) where u(i)⊳Xi. Therefore, cE = 0 and
cX̂A 6= 0.
• On the other hand, there exist β1, β2, . . . , βr such that
(cX̂A |cE) =
r∑
ℓ=1
βℓL
′
jℓ
.
Since r < µ and cE = 0, by Property A we have cX̂A =
0.
We obtain a contradiction.
Remark 5.5: From Lemma 5.4, a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure
linear randomized index code requires at least µ random
symbols. We show in Section V-C that there exists such a
code that uses precisely µ random symbols.
Lemma 5.6: Suppose that L corresponds to a linear µ-
randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq. If this randomized index
code is (µ, t)-strongly secure, then for all i ∈ [µ], there exists
a vector v(i) ∈ Fn+µq satisfying
1) v(i) ⊳ [n];
2) v(i) + en+i ∈ C(L).
Proof: Assume, by contradiction, that for some i ∈ [µ],
we have v(i) + en+i /∈ C(L) for all v(i) ⊳ [n]. Consider a
virtual receiver, which has a side information set {xj}j∈[n],
and requests the symbol gi. By Corollary 4.4, this virtual
receiver has no information about gi after listening to all
transmissions. In other words, we have
H(Gi|(X |G)L,X) = H(Gi) , (18)
and, in particular, for a smaller set of side information,
H(Gi|(X|G)L,XXA) = H(Gi) . (19)
We recall Definition 5.3: for every µ-subset W ⊆ [N ] and
every t-subset XA ⊆ [n], we have
H(XX̂A |(X|G)L[W ],XXA) = H(XX̂A) . (20)
In the sequel we show that if the value of Gi is known to the
adversary, this randomized index code is still (µ, t)-strongly
secure. In other words, we aim to show that
H(X X̂A |(X|G)L[W ],XXA , Gi) = H(X X̂A) , (21)
for every µ-subset W ⊆ [N ] and every t-subset XA ⊆ [n].
Indeed, the left-hand side of (21) is equal to
H(XX̂A |(X|G)L[W ],XXA)−I(XX̂A ;Gi|(X|G)L[W ],XXA),
which is
H(XX̂A)− I(XX̂A ;Gi|(X |G)L[W ],XXA)
due to (20). Hence, it suffices to show that
I(X X̂A ;Gi | (X|G)L[W ],XXA) = 0 .
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We have
I(XX̂A ;Gi|(X|G)L[W ],XXA)
= H(Gi|(X |G)L[W ],XXA)
− H(Gi|(X|G)L[W ],XXA ,XX̂A)
= H(Gi|(X |G)L[W ],XXA)
− H(Gi|(X|G)L[W ],X)
= H(Gi)− H(Gi)
= 0 ,
where the third transition is due to (18) and (19).
To this end, we have shown that the randomized index
code is still (µ, t)-strongly secure if the adversary knows
the realized value of Gi. Equivalently, discarding the random
variable Gi from the scheme does not affect its strong security.
However, this contradicts Lemma 5.4, since the resulting code
has less than µ random symbols.
The following theorem proves a lower bound on the length
of a (µ, t)-strongly secure linear randomized index code.
Theorem 5.7: The length of a (µ, t)-strongly secure linear
η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq is at least κq + µ.
Proof: Suppose the linear randomized index code is based
on L. We divide the proof into several cases.
Case 1: η = µ. Then, by Corollary 4.5 and Lemma 5.6, the
subspace C(L) must contain:
• the vectors u(i) + ef(i) for some u(i) ⊳ Xi, for
all i ∈ [m];
• the vectors v(i) + en+i, for some v(i) ⊳ [n], for
all i ∈ [µ].
Due to linear independence of these vectors and to
the definition of κq, the length of the code is at least
dim(C(L)) ≥ rankq({u
(i) + ef(i)}i∈[m])
+ rankq({v
(i) + en+i}i∈[µ])
≥ κq + µ .
Case 2: η > µ, and for all i ∈ [η] there exists some vector
v(i) ⊳ [n] such that u(i) + en+i ∈ C(L).
In this case, similarly to Case 1, we have
dim(C(L)) ≥ κq + η > κq + µ.
Therefore, L has at least κq + µ columns.
Case 3: η > µ, and for some i ∈ [η], v(i) + en+i /∈ C(L)
for all v(i) ⊳ [n]. By following exactly the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.6, we deduce
that discarding Gi does not affect the strong security
of the randomized index code. By doing so, we
obtain a new randomized (µ, t)-strongly secure index
code, which has η−1 random variables. This code is
based on L′, which is obtained from L by deleting
its (n+ i)-th row.
The above argument can be applied until either the
number of random variables decreses to µ, or the
code in consideration satisfies the condition of Case
2. In both cases, the resulting randomized index code
has length at least κq +µ. As the length of the code
do not change during the process, we conclude that
the length of the original code is at least κq + µ.
The next theorem establishes a lower bound on the length
of a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure linear randomized index code.
Theorem 5.8: The length of a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure lin-
ear η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq is at least κq+µ+
2δ.
Proof: Let L correspond to a (µ, t, δ)-strongly secure η-
randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq. Let L′ be the matrix
obtained by deleting any 2δ columns of L. Since L corre-
sponds to a δ-error-correcting index code, by Lemma 5.1 it
satisfies
wt
(∑
i∈K
ziLi
)
≥ 2δ + 1 ,
for all K ∈ J (m,n,X , f) and all choices of nonzero zi ∈ Fq,
i ∈ K . We obtain that the rows of L′ satisfy
wt
(∑
i∈K
ziL
′
i
)
≥ 1 .
By Corollary 5.2, L′ corresponds to an η-randomized
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq. Since all entries of L′ are contained
in L, we deduce that L′ corresponds to a (µ, t)-strongly
secure η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq . Therefore, by
Theorem 5.7, L′ has at least κq + µ columns. Therefore, L
has at least κq + µ+ 2δ columns.
C. A Construction of Optimal Strongly Secure Index Codes
In this section, we present a construction of an optimal
(µ, t, δ)-strongly secure µ-randomized linear (m,n,X , f)-IC
over Fq, which has length attaining the lower bound estab-
lished in Theorem 5.8. It requires q to be at least κq+µ+2δ+1.
The proposed construction is based on the coset coding
technique, originally introduced by Ozarow and Wyner [31].
This technique has been adopted in a variety of network coding
applications, such as [18]–[22].
Construction A: Let L(0) correspond to a linear
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq of optimal length κq. Let M be a
generator matrix of an [N = κq + µ + 2δ, κq + µ, 2δ + 1]q
MDS code, so that the last µ rows of M form a generator
matrix of another MDS code. For instance, take
M =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αN
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
α
κq−1
1 α
κq−1
2 · · · α
κq−1
N
α
κq
1 α
κq
2 · · · α
κq
N
α
κq+1
1 α
κq+1
2 · · · α
κq+1
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
α
κq+µ−1
1 α
κq+µ−1
2 · · · α
κq+µ−1
N

,
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where α1, α2, . . . , αN are pairwise distinct nonzero elements
in Fq . Let P be the submatrix of M formed by the first κq
rows, and Q the submatrix formed by the last µ rows of M .
Take
L =
(
L(0)P
Q
)
.
Lemma 5.9: The matrix L in Construction A corresponds
to a δ-error-correcting µ-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq.
Proof: Recall that g ∈ Fµq is a random vector. The
encoding function E has a form
E(x, g) = (x|g)L = xL(0)P + gQ = (xL(0)|g)M .
Since M is a generator matrix of a δ-error-correcting code,
each receiver Ri, i ∈ [m], is able to recover (xL(0)|g) if
the number of errors in E(x, g) is less than or equal to δ.
Therefore, each receiver Ri can recover xL(0), and hence, it
can also recover xf(i), i ∈ [m], as L(0) corresponds to a linear
(m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq.
Lemma 5.10: The matrix L in Construction A corresponds
to a (µ, t)-strongly secure µ-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over
Fq.
Proof: Suppose that the adversary A possess a message
vector xXA , |xXA | = t. Additionally, A can eavesdrop µ
transmissions, i.e. it has a knowledge of b △= (x|g)L[W ], for
some W ⊆ [N ], |W | = µ. Below, we show that the entropy
of XX̂A is not changed given the knowledge of (X|G)L[W ]
and of xXA . It suffices to show that for all a ∈ Fn−tq :
Pr(X X̂A = a | (X|G)L[W ] = b, XXA = xXA) =
1
qn−t
.
(22)
The left-hand side of (22) can be re-written as
Pr(XX̂A = a, (X|G)L[W ] = b |XXA = xXA)
Pr((X|G)L[W ] = b |XXA = xXA)
. (23)
The numerator in (23) is given by
Pr(X X̂A = a, (X|G)L[W ] = b |XXA = xXA)
= Pr(X X̂A = a |XXA = xXA)
× Pr((X |G)L[W ] = b | xX̂A = a,XXA = xXA)
=
1
qn−t
Pr((X |G)L[W ] = b |XX̂A = a,XXA = xXA)
=
1
qn−t
1
qµ
=
1
qn−t+µ
.
(24)
The penultimate transition can be explained as follows. We
have
b = (X|G)L[W ] =XL(0)P [W ] +GQ[W ] . (25)
The matrix Q[W ] is invertible due to the fact that Q is a
generator matrix of an [N,µ]-MDS code. Since X is known,
the system (25) has a unique solution given by
G = (b−XL(0)P [W ])(Q[W ])−1 .
Since G is uniformly distributed over Fµq ,
Pr((X |G)L[W ] = b |XX̂A = a,XXA = xXA)
= Pr(G = (b−XL(0)P [W ])(Q[W ])−1)
=
1
qµ
.
Similarly to (24), the denominator in (23) is
Pr((X |G)L[W ] = b |XXA = xXA)
=
∑
c∈Fn−tq
Pr(X X̂A = c |XXA = xXA)
× Pr((X |G)L[W ] = b |XX̂A = c,XXA = xXA)
= qn−t
1
qn−t
1
qµ
=
1
qµ
.
(26)
From (23), (24), and (26), we obtain (22), as claimed.
From Theorem 5.8, Lemma 5.9, and Lemma 5.10, we obtain
the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.11: The length of an optimal (µ, t, δ)-strongly
secure linear η-randomized (m,n,X , f)-IC over Fq (q ≥ κq+
µ+2δ+1) is κq+µ+2δ. Moreover, the code in Construction
A achieves this optimal length.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this paper, we initiate a study of the security aspects of
linear index coding schemes. We introduce a notion of block
security and establish two bounds on the security level of a
linear index code based on the matrix L. These analysis makes
use of the minimum distance and the dual distance of C(L),
the code spanned by the columns of L. While the dimension
of this code corresponds to the number of transmissions in
the scheme, the minimum distance characterizes its security
strength.
Our second contribution is the analysis of the strong security
of linear index codes. New bounds on the length of linear
index codes, which are resistant to errors, eavesdropping, and
information leaking, are established. Index codes that achieve
these bounds are constructed. These new bounds cannot be
deduced directly from the existing results in network coding
literature.
One important problem, which remains open, deals with
a design of an optimal secure index coding scheme. This
problem can be formulated as follows: given an instance of
the ICSI problem, how to design L, such that C(L) has the
largest possible minimum distance? More specifically, let us
define the binary side information matrix A = (ai,j)i∈[n], j∈[n]
as in [6], namely
ai,j =
{
1 if j = i or j ∈ Xi
0 otherwise .
The problem is equivalent to finding a way to turn certain off-
diagonal 1’s in A into 0’s, such that the rows of the resulting
matrix generate an error-correcting code of the largest possible
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minimum distance. It is very likely that this task is a hard
problem. For comparison, even finding the minimum distance
of an error-correcting code given by its generating matrix is
known to be NP-hard [32].
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